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Abstract
We estimate a job search model with four main ingredients: (i) search on-the-job;
(ii) wage growth on-the-job; (iii) minimum wages, with potentially imperfect com-
pliance; and, (iv) exogenous wage growth on-the-job. We use data drawn from the
NLSY79 to estimate the parameters of our job search model and, in particular, the
extent of compliance to the minimum wage. The model is solved numerically and we
use simulated moments to estimate the parameters. The estimated parameters are
consistent with the model and they provide a good ﬁt for the observed level and trend
of main labor market moments. Furthermore, the arrival rate of job oﬀers below the
minimum wage is 40% lower than the arrival rate of job oﬀers above the minimum
wage.
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11 Introduction
Wage data from National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth of 1979 (NLSY79) indicate that
during the ﬁrst six months after graduation from high school about 25 percent of white males
earn an hourly wage below the US federal legal minimum wage. This percentage is reduced
to 15 percent after a year following graduation, about 9 percent after three years and from
the tenth year about three percent of the high school graduates earn an hourly wage below
the minimum wage (see Figure 14). Figures reported by U.S. Bureau of Census (1997, p.
433) show that as many as 40% of workers who qualify are paid less than the minimum wage.
The evidence on compliance of workers and ﬁrms with the minimum wage law goes back to
Ashenfelter and Smith (1979). They compute compliance as the fraction of workers earning
less than the minimum wage before the enactment of the law, and who earned exactly the
minimum wage after the enactment of the law. They conclude that “for the country as a
w h o l et h ep o i n te s t i m a t eo ft h ec o m p l i a n c er a t ei s6 9 % ,a l t h o u g hac o n v e n t i o n a lc o n ﬁdence
interval would include the range in the 63-75%”. More recent work by Cortes (2004) studies
whether immigrants are more likely to be paid less than the minimum wage than natives and,
overall, she ﬁnds no systematic pattern of noncompliance between immigrants and natives.
Finally, Weil et. al. (2004) use data on apparel contractors in the Los Angeles area, and ﬁnd
that 54% of employers in 2000 did not comply with minimum wage laws, and that 27% of
employees were paid below the minimum wage. This evidence suggest that a large proportion
of wages reported in the NLSY79 to below the minimum wage are due to noncompliance
rather than just measurement error in wages.
This paper uses the standard Burdett (1978) and Lucas and Prescott (1974) search
on-the-job models to estimate the extent of compliance to the minimum wage in the US.
Observed wages below the minimum wage can result from both non-compliance and/or mea-
surement error (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979). But while measurement error should apply
throughout the wage distribution, non-compliance, by deﬁnition, applies to actual accepted
wages below the minimum wage. This distinction will be the basis of our identiﬁcation
strategy of the extent of compliance with the US federal minimum wage.
We construct a continuous time search model in a stationary labor market environment
with the following ingredients: (i) search on the job; (ii) minimum wages with imperfect
compliance by ﬁrms; (iii) endogenous search eﬀort; (iv) exogenous wage growth on-the-job.1
The model is solved numerically and we use simulated moments to estimate the parameters.
The estimated parameters are consistent with the model and they provide a good ﬁtf o rt h e
level, the trend and the ﬂuctuations of several moments that are used for estimation. We
ﬁnd that the arrival rate of job oﬀers below the minimum wage is 40% lower than the arrival
rate of job oﬀers above the minimum wage. There are good reasons to believe that this is
an over-estimate of the true non-compliance of ﬁrms with the minium wage federal law.
The literature on the minimum wage policy is large and we certainly do not attempt
to cover it here. However, it is well recognized that the analysis of this policy requires an
1Bowlus and Neuman (2004) use a search equilibrium model to empirically analyze the wage growth using
NLSY data.
2equilibrium model where ﬁrms and workers respond to the change in policy. This basic claim
provides the reason that minimum wage policy was analyzed by Eckstein and Wolpin (1990),
van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Flinn (2003, 2004), among others, in estimable search
equilibrium models. Here we use a simple search model where the equilibrium is interpreted
as in Lucas and Prescott (1974). The main reason for our choice of the model is that by
using data such as the NLSY79 it is not clear that one can empirically distinguish between
the diﬀerent search models (see. e.g., Eckstein and van den Berg, 2004). The simple search
model is a benchmark speciﬁcation where the observed wage dispersion and labor market
mobility of workers are due to productivity diﬀerence across ﬁrms, worker heterogeneity and
worker search decisions. In this simple model wage dispersion and worker mobility are not
a result of the response of ﬁr m sa n dt h ee n d o g e n o u sw a g ef o r m a t i o nw i t h i na ne q u i l i b r i u m
labor market with frictions (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). Here, the wage dispersion
is due to the assumed productivity diﬀerences between potentially homogenous workers, but
where aditional disperssion is due to the worker dynamic search decision rules.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our job search model. Section
3 describes our data set. Section 4 gives the estimation method, and Section 5 presents
preliminary results.
2 The Model
We construct a continuous time search model in a stationary labor market environment
with the following ingredients: (i) search on the job; (ii) minimum wages with imperfect
compliance by ﬁrms; (iii) endogenous search eﬀort; (iv) exogenous wage growth on-the-job.
Agents are inﬁnitely lived, and at each moment in time they can be either non-employed
(a state denoted by n) or employed (a state denoted by e). When they are unemployed,
they enjoy some real return b (typically including the value of leisure and unemployment
insurance beneﬁts), and receive job oﬀers at a Poisson rate λn. Generating job oﬀers at
rate λn requires some search eﬀort, with related search costs cn(λn),w i t hc0
n(λn) > 0 and
c00
n(λn) > 0. When employed, they enjoy a real wage w, which is growing at an exogenous
rate g, receive job oﬀers at a Poisson rate λe, and bear search costs ce(λe),w i t hc0
e(λe) > 0
and c00
n(λe) > 0. Existing jobs are hit by idiosyncratic shocks, which occur at a Poisson rate
δ. The instantaneous discount rate is r.N e w w a g e o ﬀers for employed and unemployed
are randomly drawn from some known, ﬁxed distribution F(w). As said above, once the
individual accept a wage w, his wage on the same jobs grow with tenure, τ, on the job such
that wτ = wegτ.
Our modelling of the wage oﬀer distribution closely resembles Lucas and Prescott (1974)
islands’ model as it is presented in Mortensen (1986). In the Lucas and Prescott formulation,
the distribution of wage oﬀers represents productivity diﬀerentials across diﬀerent islands.
As productivity in each island is subject to idiosyncratic shocks, workers need to spend some
eﬀort in order to locate better matching opportunities and eventually relocate across islands
in pursuit of wage gains. In our model, the wage oﬀer distribution represents productivity
diﬀerentials across ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm productivity is given, but better matching opportunities
3arise to workers through search on-the-job.
There is an exogenously set minimum wage in the economy, denoted by wM. However,
there is no full compliance of ﬁrms with the minimum wage. We assume that ﬁrms with lower
than the minimum wage productivity continue to oﬀer jobs for wages below the minimum
wage. Hence, workers still face some positive probability to receive an oﬀer which pays
below the minimum wage. We denote by λn and λe the arrival rates of job oﬀers above the
minimum wage for the unemployed and the employed, respectively, and by αλn and αλe the
corresponding arrival rates of job oﬀers below the minimum wage, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. When
α =0there is full compliance of ﬁrms and workers with the economy minimum wage. When
α =1there is no eﬀective minimum wage regulation in the economy. Hence, in this model
the minimum wage policy has two parameters, the level on the minimum wage, wM, and the
level of compliance, α.
In this paper we focus on high school graduate males that do not attend college and we
follow them since they leave school.2 Below we compute lifetime utilities for the employed
and the non-employed. The value of employment τ p e r i o d so nt h es a m ej o bi sd e n o t e db y
Ve(wτ) and the value of non-employment clearly does not depend on speciﬁc job attributes
and is denoted by Vn.
A worker who is currently non-employed enjoys a net ﬂow of income b−cn(λn), receives
job oﬀers above or below the minimum wage at rates λn and αλn, respectively, which are
accepted if the value attached to them exceeds the value of non-employment:
rVn = b − cn(λn)+λn{Ew≥wM max[0,V e(w) − Vn]}
+αλn {Ew<wM max[Ve(w) − Vn,0]}. (1)
A worker currently employed in a job with starting wage w and tenure τ receives net
income wτ − ce(λe), enjoys wage growth at rate g, is forcibly separated from her employer
at rate δ, and receives job oﬀers above or below the minimum wage at rates λe and αλe,
respectively, which are accepted if the value attached to them exceeds the lifetime utility in
the current job:
rVe(wτ)=wτ − ce(λe)+δ[Vn − Ve(wτ)]
+λeEw≥wM max[0,V e(w) − Ve(wτ)] + αλeEw<wM max[0,V e(w) − Ve(wτ)]
+gwτV
0
e(wτ) for wτ <w M
and
rVe(wτ)=wτ − ce(λe)+δ[Vn − Ve(wτ)]
+λeEw max[0,V e(w) − Ve(wτ)] + gwτV
0
e(wτ) for wτ ≥ wM,
2We suppose for now that each individual starts search for a job at the month he leaves school, and he is
assumed to be unemployed. Later we will relax this assumption for the empirical application.
4where the last term in each case represents the change in value on the job, that is,
∂Ve(wτ)
∂τ .
In either labor market state, agents set an acceptance rule for job oﬀe r sa n dt h eo p t i m a l
level of search eﬀort. As job switching involves no cost, the optimal acceptance rule for the
employed consists in accepting any job that pays more than their current wage w. For the
non-employed, the optimal acceptance rule consists in accepting all job oﬀers which pay at
least some reservation wage w∗, such that Vn = Ve(w∗). Note that such reservation wage
exists and is unique because, while the value of search is constant, the value of employment
is monotonically increasing in w.I f wM ≤ w∗, then minimum wages have no impact on
agents’ decisions or equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, we assume that the minimum wage is
binding , i.e. wM >w ∗, such that the value functions in this model can be rewritten as:
rVn = b − cn(λn)+λn
Z
wM
[Ve (w) − Vn]dF(w)+αλn
Z wM
w∗
[Ve (w) − Vn]dF(w) (2)
and




[Ve (w) − Ve (wτ)]dF(w)+gwτV
0
e(wτ) for wτ ≥ wM (3)
rVe(wτ)=wτ − ce(λe)+δ[Vn − Ve(wτ)] + λe
Z
wM




[Ve (w) − Ve (wτ)]dF(w)+gwτV
0
e(wτ) for wτ <w M, (4)
Note that in (3) the probability of getting an oﬀer below the minimum wage (αλe)d o e sn o t
aﬀect the value of employment, as any such oﬀer would be rejected by someone employed at
w ≥ wM.
A non-employed worker will choose λn in order to maximize (2). The ﬁrst-order condition






[Ve (w) − Vn]dF(w)+α
Z wM
w∗
[Ve (w) − Vn]dF(w), (5)
thus equating the marginal cost of an extra job oﬀer to its marginal beneﬁt. Similarly, the







0) − Ve (w)]dF(w











[Ve (w) − Vn]dF(w),i fw<w M. (7)
By convexity of the search cost function, the unemployed will have a higher incentive to
search for jobs, and, keeping everything else equal, raise their arrival rate of job oﬀers above
5t h eo n eo ft h ee m p l o y e d . A m o n gt h ee m p l o y e d ,s e a r c he ﬀort decreases with the current
wage: in particular, those employed below the minimum wage will search more intensively
than those employed above.
Given the acceptance rule rVn = rVe (w∗), we can solve for the value of the reservation
wage by setting equation (2) equal to equation (4) evaluated at w = w∗ and τ =0(exploiting
the continuity of Ve (wτ) at wM, a property that only holds if the wage oﬀer distribution is
t h es a m ea b o v eo rb e l o wt h em i n i m u mw a g e ) :
w
∗ = b − cn(λn)+ce(λe)+( λn − λe)
Z
w∗
[Ve (w) − Vn]dF(w)
−(1 − α)(λn − λe)
Z wM
w∗





















using integration by parts.
T os o l v ee q u a t i o n( 9 )o n en e e d st ok n o wt h ef u n c t i o nV 0

























R(w0,τ)=( r + δ − g)τ + λe
Z τ
0
[1 − F(wτ)]dτ,f o rwτ ≥ wM (12)
R(w0,τ)=( r + δ − g)τ + λe
Z τ
0
[1 − αF(wτ) − (1 − α)F(wM)]dτ,f o rwτ <w M.(13)
The reservation wage can be numerically calculated substituting (10)-(13) into (9). If
the job oﬀer arrival rates are set exogenously, then the model is fully solved by calculating
the reservation wage w∗ using the solution to (9). Otherwise, the joint solution of w∗,λ n
and λe is found by solving jointly (9), (5), (6) and (7), and this solution enable us to
simulate the dynamic decision sequence of the worker. This solution provides a joint dynamic
distribution of labor market mobility from non-employment to work, from job-to-job and
back to non-employment. Furthermore, this solution enables us the calculate by simulations
the probability of all labor market states conditional on observed wages and, in particular, on
whether the observed wage is below or above the minimum wage. Finally, the model provides
a characterization of the probability to observe worker that are employed at a wage below
6the minimum wage and above the minimum wage. When α =0the probability to observe
a wage below the minimum wage is zero, hence, the only way to justify this observation if
t h e r ei sf u l lc o m p l i a n c ew i t ht h el a w ,i st oa ssume that wages are reported with error. This
is the main alternative hypothesis to the claim that there is no full compliance (0 <α≤ 1)
with the minimum wage law.
3D a t a
We use data drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths, which contains infor-
mation on a sample of 12686 respondents who were between 14 and 21 years of age in January
1979 (NLSY79). Our sample is restricted to white males who are high school gradutes, and
never returned to school. Speciﬁcally, we select non-black, non-hispanic, males who have
completed at most 12 years of schooling and declare to hold high school degree. We exclude
from our sample those who (i) ever went to the army; (ii) ever declared to be in college;
(iii) ever declared to have a college or professional degree. We further restrict our sample to
those who completed high school between age 17 and 19. These restrictions leave us with a
sample of 577 individuals.
Information on selected respondents is available from calendar time January 1978. We
construct individual monthly work histories using answers to retrospective questions. We
assume that market entry coincides with calendar month an individual completed high school.
I n d i v i d u a l si no u rs a m p l ec o m p l e t e dh i g hs c h o o lb e t w e e n1 9 7 4a n d1 9 8 4 . M o r et h a n9 5 %
of them graduated in either May or June. We follow the individuals for 18 years after high
school graduation and the data is organized to be consistent with the model’s deﬁnitions
and assumptions.
Labor Market States From the NLSY79 work history ﬁle, we obtain the monthly em-
ployment and non-employment (labor force status) from the ﬁrst month of 1978 to the last
month of 1998. We deﬁne an individual as employed in a month if he works at least 10 hours
per week and at least three weeks per month, or during the last two weeks in the month.
Otherwise, the individual is non-employed, and we do not further distinguish between un-
employed and out of the labor force. Figure 1 shows the monthly proportion of employed
and non-employed by the years since high school graduation. The data shows clear pattern
of seasonality.3
Among those who were found in employment upon ﬁnishing high school, some started
working before graduation. As Figure 2 shows, on average 55% of individuals in our sample
worked during the year preceding graduation. This may happen because job search starts
while in school or, more likely, because high school students may take up temporary and
part time jobs while in school. The latter explanation seems also supported by the clear
3We focus here on the growth of employment on the extensive margine. It should be noted that average
hours per-employed worker also shows a positive trend during the ﬁrst eight years (Table 1). This intensive
margine is not part of this paper but could be added to the search framework discussed here.
7seasonal pattern of employment rates during the last year before graduation. We assume that
individuals employed before graduation enter the “oﬃcial” labor market upon graduation,
but we will treat the proportion of individuals employed at labor market entry as an initial
condition in our simulations.
The employment history information is employer-based. All references to a “job” should
be understood as references to an employer. Multiple jobs held contemporaneously are
treated as new jobs altogether: the associated wage is the average of the two hourly wages
and the associated hours are the sum of the hours worked on the diﬀerent jobs. Duration of
a given job is considered as completed when a new job is recorded or the work is terminated
and the individual is back to non-employment.
Table 1 gives employment statistics by years of labor market experience after graduation.
Both the average number of months worked and average annual hours increase with experi-
ence. As expected, the average yearly cumulative number of jobs decreases with experience
from 1.52 to 1.21 jobs, while to cumulative jobs per worker reach about 6.5 after 18 years.4
Table 2 reports the duration of non-employment spells leading to the ﬁrst 10 jobs in
individual careers, which seems to fall roughly monotonically with the job rank. 103 ob-
servations had more than 10 jobs, 12 of whom had more than 20 jobs. The maximum
number of jobs held is 27. As we have several censored spells in our sample, the sample
mean duration is downward biased. In column 5 we therefore also present the Kaplan-Meier
nonparametric durations estimates.5 If the observation with the largest associated duration
is censored, the Kaplan-Meier survivor function does not go to zero as duration goes to in-
ﬁnity. Consequently, the area under the curve still underestimates the mean duration. We
thus extrapolate the survivor function using an exponential density function to compute the
area under the entire curve, and from this one we obtain the Kaplan-Meier extended mean
duration. This is reported in column 5 of table 2, and the mean duration between for each
job is estimated to be about six to one month longer using the extended (column 5) rather
than the restricted (column 4) Kaplan-Meier estimates.6
Figure 3 plots the job separation hazard by job tenure. We do not distinguish among job
ranks, due to the insuﬃcient number of observations for each rank. Duration is truncated at
10 years (and consequently 83 out of 2539 job spells are dropped). The monthly job hazard
rate decreases signiﬁcantly with duration, consistently with the above search model with
4In the Bureau of Labor Statistics report on “Number of jobs held, labor market activity, and earnings
growth among younger baby boomers: results from more than two decades of a longitudinal survey” (BLS
2002, Table 1), the average number of jobs held by white high school graduates is 9.2, which is higher than
our ﬁgure. Such discrepancy stems from the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of jobs. BLS deﬁne a job as an uninterrupted
period of work with a particular employer, excluding recalls from temporary layoﬀs. In our deﬁnition we do
not exclude recalls.
5Let nt be the population alive at time t and dt the number of failures. The nonparametric maximum
likelihood estimate of the survivor function is:c S(t)=Πj|tj6t(
nj−dj
nj ). The Kaplan-Meier restricted mean
duration is computed as the area under the Kaplan-Meier survivor function. And the associated standard





6Using job identiﬁers, individuals recalled by old employers after a nonemployment spell are considered
as staying in the same job.
8Table 1: Employment statistics by labor market experience
Year after Ave. months Ave. annual Ave. cumulative Cumulative
graduation worked* hours** no. of jobs jobs
1 8.74 (3.96) 2031 (458) 1.52 (0.74) 1.52 (0.74)
2 9.54 (3.42) 2082 (440) 1.40 (0.64) 1.99 (1.14)
3 9.79 (3.51) 2130 (489) 1.36 (0.68) 2.41 (1.52)
4 10.10 (3.23) 2153 (443) 1.33 (0.65) 2.88 (1.84)
5 10.32 (3.07) 2200 (506) 1.31 (0.64) 3.28 (2.17)
6 10.48 (2.86) 2212 (469) 1.33 (0.65) 3.72 (2.53)
7 10.55 (2.90) 2195 (490) 1.29 (0.62) 4.07 (2.79)
8 10.86 (2.58) 2206 (492) 1.24 (0.55) 4.39 (3.03)
9 10.96 (2.49) 2226 (510) 1.29 (0.68) 4.72 (3.34)
10 10.86 (2.66) 2256 (569) 1.29 (0.64) 5.06 (3.61)
11 11.06 (2.34) 2292 (555) 1.21 (0.50) 5.29 (3.81)
12 11.16 (2.27) 2309 (548) 1.23 (0.56) 5.52 (4.00)
13 10.98 (2.44) 2337 (552) 1.21 (0.49) 5.74 (4.17)
14 10.93 (2.70) 2288 (549) 1.21 (0.56) 5.95 (4.32)
15 11.15 (2.32) 2352 (677) 1.21 (0.48) 6.15 (4.53)
16 11.10 (2.48) 2342 (616) 1.19 (0.47) 6.31 (4.68)
17 10.96 (2.84) 2360 (621) 1.19 (0.49) 6.45 (4.77)
18 11.00(2.79) 2356 (615) 1.14 (0.44) 6.55 (4.87)
Standard errors are in paratheses. * The value is conditional on observations where all
states are available in all months.** Average hours are conditional on working in all months.
Table 2: Duration of non-employment spells and job spells ( 1 to 10 jobs) since high school
gradaution
Job No. No. of obs. Sample Mean Kaplan-Meier restricted Kaplan-Meier extended
duration (s.d.) Mean duration (s.d.) Mean duration
NE∗ 148 8.86 (23.90) 9.93 (2.37) 10.74
1 574 32.74 (53.94) 38.69 (2.76) 44.85
2 508 33.77 (49.05) 41.03 (2.85) 47.66
3 457 27.82 (38.35) 39.37 (3.10) 46.98
4 387 24.71 (33.28) 34.06 (2.77) 37.73
5 337 22.22 (30.91) 31.23 (2.73) 35.05
6 276 20.38 (28.84) 32.33 (3.83) 37.95
7 236 23.23 (31.30) 34.59 (3.40) 40.31
8 182 17.92 (25.78) 24.82 (3.07) 29.51
9 150 17.58 (19.22) 21.51 (2.12) 22.12
10 131 16.96 (22.31) 24.19 (3.40) 28.10
* Mean duration of non-employment conditional on non-employment in τ =1 .
9wage growth on-the-job and/or endogenous eﬀorts (see Mortensen, 1986).
Figures 4—6 show labor market transition rates by experience. The probability of staying
on the same job increases slightly, that of staying non-employed decreases, and that leaving
non-employment decreases. Both the employment exit and job-to-job ﬂows have relatively
large ﬂuctuations with relatively low negative trend at the early years. All transitions, in
Figures 4-6, seem to reach a constant rate after ten years. Furthermore, there are large
monthly ﬂuctuations with some evidence for seasonality. The search model should be able
to ﬁt the trends and levels of these transition rates, but is not likely to ﬁt the monthly
ﬂuctuations.
Wages and Employment Cycles We next deﬁne employment cycles, in order to set the
data in a way that is consistent with the search model (see Wolpin, 1992). Each cycle starts
with non-employment and terminates with the last job before a subsequent non-employment
spell. Since 55% of individuals in the sample started working before graduation, their ﬁrst
cycle started with their ﬁrst job instead of non-employment. For an individual i, the sequence


















For each cycle j and individual i, we record the non-employment duration, the wage in the
ﬁrst job, the ﬁrst job duration, the wage in the second job, the second job duration, and so
on.
The NLSY collects data on respondents’ usual earnings (inclusive of tips, overtime, and
bonuses, before deductions) during every survey year for each employer for whom the re-
spondent worked since the last interview date. The amount of earnings, reported in dollars
and cents, is coupled with information on the applicable unit of time, e.g., per day, per hour,
per week, per year, etc. Combining earnings andt i m eu n i td a t a ,t h ev a r i a b l e“ h o u r l yr a t e
of pay job #1-5” in the work history ﬁle provides the hourly wage rate for each job. We use
coded real hourly wage in 2000 dollars. Nominal wage data are deﬂated by monthly CPI
from BLS CPI-U. We top code the hourly wage at 150$ until 1990, and at 200$ afterwards.
Note that, given the way in which the NLSY constructs wage information, we do not exactly
have monthly wages. In particular, an individual’s hourly wage is constant within a year
unless he moves job. Clearly, when we convert nominal wage in real terms, real wages may
decrease with inﬂa t i o n ,b u tt h i si sm a yo rm a yn o tb et h ec o r r e c ta c t u a lp a yf o re a c hm o n t h .
We focus on the data of accepted real hourly wage. Table 3 reports the mean accepted
wage on the ﬁrst ﬁve jobs in the ﬁrst three cycles. As expected, mean wages increase with
job moves within cycles. When the second cycle starts, the mean accepted wage on the ﬁrst
job is lower than the accepted real wage on the third to ﬁf t hj o b si nt h eﬁrst cycle. When
new cycles start, the mean accepted wage on the ﬁrst job is lower than the accepted real
wage on late jobs of previous cycles. Furthermore, the real accepted wage increases by jobs
during the second cycle but this doesn’t hold clearly during the cycle. These patterns are
potentially consistent with the prediction of our search model, but the empirical analysis
requires more formal analysis.
10Table 3: Mean wages in the ﬁrst three cycles of labor market careers
Mean wage Mean wage Mean wage
above wM below wM
First Cycle
Job 1 8.22 (306) 9.16 (239) 4.89 (67)
Job 2 10.37 (192) 10.75 (179) 5.17 (13)
Job 3 11.85 (132) 11.96 (130) 4.99 (2)
Job 4 12.43 (77) 13.24 (70) 4.26 (7)
Job 5 12.64 (42) 12.83 (41) 4.87 (1)
Second Cycle
Job 1 10.22 (311) 11.15 (264) 4.99 (47)
Job 2 11.02 (178) 11.50 (165) 4.96 (13)
Job 3 11.49 (84) 12.21 (77) 3.47 (7)
Job 4 13.13 (56) 13.27 (55) 5.46 (1)
Job 5 15.27 (29) 15.27 (29) -
Third Cycle
Job 1 9.95 (242) 10.61 (217) 4.29 (25)
Job 2 11.29 (125) 11.86 (115) 4.72 (10)
Job 3 11.81 (71) 12.22 (67) 5.02 (4)
Job 4 10.98 (39) 11.16 (38) 4.38 (1)
Job 5 14.20 (24) 14.20 (24) -
11Table 4: Number of months working below the minimum wage








The federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees is currently at $5.15 an
hour.7 From Figure 7 we see that between 1978 and 2002, the nominal federal minimum
wage increased from $2.65 to $5.15. However, the real minimum wage, deﬂated by monthly
CPI-U and expressed in 2000 dollars, has been decreasing during this sample period. Several
states also have minimum wage laws. Where an employee is subject to both the state and
federal minimum wage laws, he or she is entitled to the higher of the two. Seven states have
no minimum wage law, namely Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina and Tennessee. Four states have minimum wage rates lower than the Federal level,
namely Kansas, New Mexico, Ohio and Virgin Islands. All other states have minimum wage
rates that are equal or higher than the Federal level. For the moment, we only take into
account the time path of the federal minimum wage in our estimates.
Various minimum wage exceptions apply under speciﬁc circumstances to workers with
disabilities, full-time students, youths under 20 in their ﬁrst 90 consecutive calendar days
of employment, tipped employees and student learners. A minimum wage of $4.25 per hour
applies to young workers under the age of 20 during their ﬁrst 90 consecutive calendar days
of employment with an employer. After 90 days or when the employee reaches age 20, he
or she must receive a minimum wage of $5.15. Full-time students can be paid not less than
85% of the minimum wage before they graduate or leave school for good. Student learners
aged 16 or more can be paid not less than 75% of the minium wage for as long as they are
enrolled in the vocational education program. Again in our baseline analysis, we do not take
exemptions into consideration.
Tables 4 and 5 show statistics on pay below the minimum wage. 47 percent of the
individuals are observed to work for a wage below the minimum wage for at least one month.
For these workers that had a job below minimum wage, the average number of months worked
below the minimum wage is 13.5, and the average number of jobs held below the minimum
wage is 1.5. The mean job duration below the minimum wage is 8.9 months. These facts
indicate that if wages are reported without an error the violation of the minimum wage law
is substantial. Mainly among young high school graduate workers.
7The federal minimum wage provisions are contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
12Table 5: Number of jobs paying below the minimum wage








Table 6 presents the mean durations of non-employment and the ﬁrst ﬁve jobs in the ﬁrst
three cycles, conditional on wages above or below the minimum wage. The mean duration
from non-employment to the ﬁrst job is lower for jobs paying at least the minimum wage.
Also, mean duration on jobs paying at least the minimum wage is always longer than mean
duration on jobs paying less than the minimum wage.
Table 7 gives the number of individuals making transitions from non-employment to
jobs, and between jobs, again conditional on wages above or below the minimum wage.
Most transitions to jobs paying less than the minimum wage originate in non-employment,
and most workers earn wages above the minimum wage once they switch job. Very few
workers move from a job paying more than the minimum wage to one paying less than the
minimum wage, and in the model we assume that this could be only a result of measurement
error in wages.
The data show evidence of wage growth on-the-job, and we assume a constant wage
growth rate g in all jobs, which can be interpreted as the return to both general and job-
speciﬁc experience. In order to estimate g, we consider wage observations in a given job:
lnwiτ =l nwi0 + τ ln(1 + g)
where wi0 is the ﬁrst wage observation for individual i and τ is job tenure. The OLS estimate
of g is 0.2%. The corresponding annual growth rate is (1 + g)12 − 1=2 .43%. (see Figure
8a). However, if we only use the ﬁrst and last wage observations on each job to compute
the growth rate and take the average across jobs, the resulting annual growth rate is -0.75%.
(see Figure 8b). The two estimates are very diﬀerent, as jobs with low or negative wage
growth tend to last relatively shorter, and are thus assigned a lower weight when using the
ﬁrst method. In particular, jobs with tenure shorter than two years have negative annual
growth on average (-1.62% for shorter tenures than one year, -0.19% for tenures between one
and two years). Jobs with tenure longer than two years have an average growth rate 1.74%
annual.8
8It should be noted that the focus of this paper is not on wage growth, which requires a separate analysis.
13Table 6: Mean duration of nonemployment and jobs in months
First Cycle Second Cycle Third Cycle
NE 7.3 (116) 5.8 (311) 5.8 (242)
To job 1 above wM 7.2 (87) 5.3 (264) 5.0 (217)
To job 1 below wM 7.7 (29) 8.7 (47) 12.6 (25)
Job 1 29.6 (306) 27.5 (311) 23.9 (242)
Above wM 31.0 (239) 29.4 (264) 25.0 (217)
Below wM 24.5 (67) 17.3 (47) 14.4 (25)
Job 2 40.3 (192) 27.5 (178) 27.8 (125)
Above wM 42.3 (179) 27 (165) 29.8 (115)
Below wM 12.9 (13) 34.4 (13) 5.2 (10)
Job 3 39.4 (132) 25.9 (84) 21.1 (71)
Above wM 39.8 (130) 26.9 (77) 22.1 (67)
Below wM 13.5 (2) 14.9 (7) 3.5 (4)
Job 4 31.2 (77) 21.5 (56) 19.6 (39)
Above wM 31.0 (70) 21.7 (55) 18.9 (38)
Below wM 32.7 (7) 12 (1) 45 (1)
Job 5 25.2 (42) 18.5 (29) 20.6 (24)
Above wM 25.7 (41) 18.5 (29) 20.6 (24)
Below wM 5( 1 ) - -
4 Estimation
Speciﬁcation. We estimate the model using simulated moments. We ﬁr s tr e s t r i c tt h em o d e l
to have exogenous arrival rates without search eﬀo r t sa n dn ow a g eg r o w t ho nt h ej o b ,s o
g =0 . We allow for unobserved heterogeneity in arrival rates and the value of unemployment
such that λn1,λ e1,λ n2,λ e2 are the non-employment and employment arrival rates of the
two types, b1 and b2 are the value of unemployment of the two types (later we will make
it also a function of unobserved and observed variables) and π is the proportion of type
one. The wage density function is assumed to be log normal, lnwi ∼ N(µi,σ2
w),µ i =
β
0xi, for the application now we assume that µi = µ.T h et i m ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e rr is
known to be 4% annually, which is 0.3% monthly. There is a measurement error to the
observed wages, such that the true wage is w and the observed wage is, wo = w + u, where
lnu ∼ N(0,σ2
u). Let δ be the rate of job destruction and α be the level of compliance
with the minimum wage. 55% of our sample worked before graduation. We assume that a
separate labor market exists during pre-graduation periods, and we characterize it by the
initial reservation wage w∗
0
9. The parameters of the model to be estimated are in the vector
9We make this assumption to match the initial wage. In the model, we assume 45% of the individuals
non-employed and 55% of them employed at τ =0 . To simulate their labor market status and wage in
τ =1 ,w eﬁrst draw one wage from the log normal distribution for each individual. If he is non-employed, we
compare the wage to his reservation wage, which is determined by the underlying parameters of the model,
14Table 7: Transitions to employment and from job-to-job (no. of obs.)
First Cycle Second Cycle Third Cycle
Unemployed (116) (311) (242)
UE to J1 above wM 87 264 217
UE to J1 below wM 29 47 25
First Job above wM (239) (264) (217)
Move to J2 above wM 93 123 88
Move to J2 below wM 466
First Job below wM (67) (47) (25)
Move to J2 above wM 22 14 11
Move to J2 below wM 422
Second Job above wM (179) (165) (115)
Move to J3 above wM 86 67 50
Move to J3 below wM 252
Second Job below wM (13) (13) (10)
Move to J3 above wM 455
Move to J3 below wM 021
Third Job above wM (130) (77) (67)
Move to J4 above wM 59 48 33
Move to J4 below wM 601
Third Job below wM (2) (7) (4)
Move to J4 above wM 221
Move to J4 below wM 000
Fourth Job above wM (70) (55) (38)
Move to J5 above wM 31 28 18
Move to J5 below wM 100
Fourth Job below wM (7) (1) (1)
Move to J5 above wM 601
Move to J5 below wM 000
15θ =[ λn1,λ e1,λ n2,λ e2,π,b 1,b 2,µ,σw,σ 2
u,δ,α,w ∗
0]0.
Data: We have a sample of white male high school graduates index by i =1 ,...,577.
We observe their employment status and wage if employed every month after high school
graduation. The data do not diﬀerentiate between unemployment and out of labor force
thus employment and non-employment are the only labor market states. Let diτi =1if the
individual is working and diτi =0if the individual is not employed, where τi is the month
after graduation or the month in the labor market. We observe the following data: [dD
iτi,w Do
iτi]
for i =1 ,···,577 and τi =1 ,···,T i, where dD
iτi,w Do
iτi are the observed labor market states
and observed wages. It should be noted that we may miss some observations on states as
well as observations on wages for many periods even if employment is observed.
Simulations: We simulate employment status and wages from the model in a consistent
way as in the data. We simulate both a conditional monthly predicted values that depend
on the observed (data) values in the relevant state (previous month) and an unconditional
monthly predicted values that depend only on the simulated values in the relevant state.
Consider ﬁrst all the individuals that have observations from τi =1 ,...T i. These are obser-
vations without left censuring. In a conditional simulation s, the model predicts ds
iτi and
ws
iτi conditional on dD
iτi−1 and wD
iτi−1 in the data. Speciﬁcally, at the starting period, τi =1 ,
the individual is either employed or non-employed, with 55% employed at graduation as we
observe in the data. Consider individual i in this sub-sample. Given the value of parameters,
we solve for the reservation wage and simulate the values of [ds
iτi=1,w s
iτi=1] for NS =2 5sim-
ulations. The simulations should also consider the unobserved uncertainty of types and the
measurement error. At τi =2 , if the individual is working and the wage is observed in the
ﬁrst period, simulate the measurement error to get the “true” wage from the data following
wD
iτi = wDo
iτi −u. Conditional on that “true” wage in τi =1 , simulate the outcome for τi =2 ,
i.e. [ds
iτi=2,w s
iτi=2]. Follow that for NS =2 5simulations. Now at τi =3 , we repeat the same
as in the previous case. Now we generate a sequence of simulated (NS =2 5 )observations
[ds
iτi,w s
iτi] for τi =1 ,...,Ti, that follow the true sequence [dD
iτi−1,w D
iτi−1] for τi =1 ,...,Ti
such that in each case that the wage is not observed, the simulated wage is dropped from
the simulated sample for all simulations. In the unconditional simulation, the prediction
of [ds
iτi,w s
iτi] does not conditional on data in the last period [dD
iτi−1,w D




For the left censored observations, suppose that the ﬁrst observation is at τi =2 . Now the
simulation for that period is based on the sequence of two simulations. First, simulate period
τi =1 , and conditional on the outcome in the ﬁrst period, simulate τi =2 . The outcome
is the [ds
iτi=2,w s
iτi=2]. The period to the future are the same as above for the observations
that are not left censored. For the case that the ﬁrst observation is at τi =3 , the ﬁrst
simulation is for 3 periods, etc. etc. Now we have (NS = 25) simulations based on the
vector of parameters θ, based on the independent uncertainty of the model that is described
above, that follows the sample exactly for each individual at each period.
Moments: We use moments from both the conditional and the unconditional simulations.
and he accepts the oﬀer as long as the wage draw exceeds the reservation wage. If he was employed, we draw
his wage such that it is at least greater than w∗
0.
16The conditional moments include the non-employment rate, mne; the proportion of individu-
a l st h a tm o v ef r o mn o n - e m p l o y m e n tt oe m p l o y m e n t ,mtr1; the proportion of individuals that
move from old job to new job, mtr2; mean wage, mw1; and the variance of wage, mw2. All
the moments are by month in the labor market.10 We ﬁrst compute all these moment from




2 . For each simulation, the same moments
a r ec o m p u t e d .T h e nt h es i m u l a t e dm o m e n t sa r et h ea v e r a g e so v e ra l ls i m u l a t i o n s ,w h i c hw e
denote by mneS(θ),m t r S
1 (θ),m t r S
2 (θ),m w S
1 (θ),m w S
2 (θ). The unconditional moment we
used is the proportion of individuals that work below the minimum wage. mpD and mpS
denote the moment in the data and in the simulation respectively.11
Implementation: We actually implement the SGMM by using a two-step iterative es-
timation procedure. In the ﬁrst step, we ﬁx θ2 =[ α,w∗
0], and use the one-period-ahead
conditional moments to estimate θ1 =[ λn1,λ n2,λ e1,λ e2,b 1,b2,π,µ,σw,σ 2
u,δ]. The conditional
moments used are the non-employment rate, the proportion moving from non-employment
to employment, the proportion moving from job to job, the mean wage and the wage variance



























Now the objective function to be minimized with respect to θ1 is,
J1(θ1)=g1(θ1)
0Wg1(θ1),
where the weighting matrix W is set to be diagonal. The weight on each moment is set to
be one over its sample mean.
In the second step θ1 is ﬁxed at its estimated values from the ﬁrst step and we use the
unconditional moments. We ﬁrst estimate w∗
0 by matching the mean wage and proportion
of individuals working below the minimum wage at τi =1 . Then we estimate α using the









and we minimize the objective function
J2(α)=g2 (α)
0 g2 (α),
with respect to α.
This procedure is replicated until convergence between the estimates for θ2 obtained in the
s e c o n ds t e pa n dθ1 obtained in the ﬁrst step. We chose to identify λn1,λ n2,λ e1,λ e2,b 1,b2,π,µ,σ2
w,σ 2
u
and δ using conditional moments, since unconditional moments would not do as good a job
in matching wage proﬁles, as wages would be rising fast upon labor market entry and then
stay basically unchanged.
10We have 18 years’ data. So each moment is a vector of 216 elements.
11See Appendix B for the exact defenitions of the moments.
17The Asymptotic Theory of the SGMM : Let yiτ =[ dD
iτi,w Do
iτi] be a vector of observed data
for individual i at some point τ over labor market experience. Given the observed state
vector at τ for individual i, ziτ, the simulated values of the random events at simulation s,
εs(ziτ), and the value of the parameters θ
∗ the model implies that,
y
s
iτ = G(ziτ,ε s(ziτ);θ
∗).
The function G(ziτ,ε s(ziτ);θ
∗) is given by the solution to the model. We assume that the
data {yiτ,z iτ}I
i=1 for all τ are i.i.d. By the independence of the simulated random variables
we have the orthogonality condition that E[G(ziτ,ε s(ziτ);θ
∗) − yiτ | ziτ]=0 . Now for NS
simulations of εs(ziη), we deﬁne h(yiτ) as the contribution of individual i for the vector of
data moments at time τ, and h(ys
iτ) as the contribution of simulation s of individual i for



















a n dw eh a v et h er e s u l tt h a tgτI(θ) −→ 0 as I −→ ∞. And under the standard regularity con-
ditions θ −→ θ




and the average of this product converges to zero as I converges to inﬁnity.12
5R e s u l t s
Parameters: The estimates of the parameters are presented in Table 8.13
The parameter estimates have plausible magnitudes and are in line with previous es-
timates of the parameters of a search model with search on-the-job. That is, the arrival
rates of job oﬀers is higher for non-employed than employed individuals and these rates
are diﬀerent by the two types of individuals, such that the mean hazard rate is decreasing.
Type 1 individuals, who are about 76 percent of workers, have lower non-employment utility
and lower arrival rates of oﬀers both as non-employed and employed. Furthermore, type 1
workers have a lower value for non-employment and a reservation wage for non-employment
of about $4.49. Type 2 workers have a higher value for non-employment and a reservation
wage of $5.61.14 Hence, type 2 may possibly work below the minimum wage only in the ﬁrst
six years following the graduation of high school (see Figure 7). The estimated reservation
wage for workers before high school graduation is $4.71, which is just above the reservation
wage of type 1 and much below the mean reservation wage for high school graduates.
12For a recent survey of the asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameters, tests and references see
Carrasco and Florens (2002).
13It turned out at the measurement error varinace, σu, could not be well identiﬁed and it seemed to be
equal to zero at the point estimates we report here. This result requires some additional analysis. The
stadard errors are not presented as these are preliminary results.
14It should be noted that the reservation wage depends on the level of the minmum wage, but using the
data it has a negligible impact on the actual value of the reservation wage.















Notes. The sample includes male high-school graduates from the NLSY. Number of obser-
vations: 577. Estimation methods: Simulated GMM.
The novelty of our results consists in providing an estimate for the extent of compliance
of ﬁrms’ job oﬀers to the minimum wage regulations. We ﬁnd that the arrival rate of job
oﬀers below the minimum wage is 40% lower than the job oﬀers above the minimum wage.
This looks very close to the results in Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) and to more recent
ﬁgures reported by the U.S. Bureau of Census (1997, p. 433).
However, there are good reasons to believe that our estimate for α is an over-estimate
of the true non-compliance of ﬁrms. First, observed wages below the minimum wage may
stem from measurement error, such that the true wage is at or above the minimum wage,
but due to measurement error the observed wage is not. As we implicitly assume that wages
are observed without error, any wage observation below the minimum wage is attributed
to non-compliance. Second, there are (limited) categories of workers who are exempt from
minimum wage regulations. And, ﬁnally, we use as minimum wage the current $5.15 federal
value, and assume that it is applied equally in all states. However, there are states that do
not have minimum wage regulations, or that adopt a minimum wage below the federal level.
On the other hand, there are also states that adopt a minimum wage above the federal level,
and this should deliver an overestimate of α in our empirical model. All these possibilities
will be considered as extensions to the current bare-bones empirical model.
Fit: To assess the goodness of ﬁt of the estimated model we show the model predictions
with data moments used to estimate the parameters. Figures 9—13 report the one-period-
ahead model predictions and data moments that we used to estimate all the parameters but
α. Both the model simulated moments and the corresponding data moments is computed
for each month following high-school graduation. The model one-period-ahead simulated
predictions of the non-employment rate (Figure 9), the mean wage (Figure 10) and the wage
variance (Figure 11) ﬁt very well the level, the trend and the ﬂuctuations in the data. The
19ﬁtt ot h eﬂuctuations is a result that we look at the cross-section conditional means where
the change in actual choice in the previous period aﬀects dramatically the predicted response
in the current period. When we compare unconditional means of these moments the model
does not ﬁtt h el a r g eﬂuctuations but is able to ﬁt the levels and less accurately to ﬁtt h e
trend. The predicted transitions from non-employment to work (Figure 12) and job-to-job
ﬁt well the levels and trends but not the very large ﬂuctuations in the actual transitions
moments.15
Counterfactuals: We perform two counterfactual policy simulations. The ﬁrst is an
increase of 20% in the minimum wage over the sample period and, the second is an increase
in compliance from 0.604 to 0.302. We use the parameter estimates reported above and we
look at the impact on the predicted moments of the model as a result of this policy. Figure
15 shows that as a result of the ﬁrst policy, the proportion of workers that are paid below
the minimum wage increases dramatically. The non-employment rate increases, but by a
negligible rate and the mean accepted wage increases by 10 to 20 cents per hour. Since
the lower arrival rates of jobs below the minimum wage covers a larger range of wages,
the probability of getting a job falls. however, it falls only very slightly from 2.0 to 1.9%
per month on average. The eﬀect of the second policy simulations is that the proportion
of workers that are paid below the minimum wage decreases and the mean accepted wage
increases slightly (see Figure 16).
15We will aslo check the ﬁte to unconditional moments and to moments related to the employment cycle
data.
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21Appendix A: Computation of V 0
e()
Using integration by parts, (3) and (4) can be rewritten as:






e (w)dw + gwτV
0
e(wτ) for wτ ≥ wM (14)
and












e (w)[1− αF(w) − (1 − α)F(wM)]dw
+gwτV
0
e(wτ) for wτ <w M
By diﬀerentiating (14) and (15):
gwτV
00(wτ)={r + δ + λe [1 − F(wτ)] − g}V
0(wτ) − 1,f o rwτ ≥ wM (16)
gwτV
00(wτ)={r + δ + λe [1 − αF(wτ) − (1 − α)F(wM)] − g}V
























[r + δ + λe[1 − F(wτ)] − g]dτ
=( r + δ − g)τ + λe
Z τ
0
[1 − F(wτ)]dτ,f o rwτ ≥ wM (19)
R(w0,τ)=( r + δ − g)τ + λe
Z τ
0
[1 − αF(wτ) − (1 − α)F(wM)]dτ,f o rwτ <w M(20)
















22A solution to the forward diﬀerential equations (16) and (17) therefore exists for all w0








To check that (22) is correct, imagine that, in general, the starting time of the process is s,








If (22) is correct, diﬀerentiation of (23) with respect to s should give the initial diﬀerential
equations (16) and (17):
V
00











[r + δ + λe[1 − F(wτ)] − g]e
−R(ws,τ)dτ − 1
=[ r + δ + λe[1 − F(wτ)] − g]V
0
e(ws) − 1,f o rwτ ≥ wM (25)
V
00
e (ws)gws =[ r + δ + λe [1 − αF(wτ) − (1 − α)F(wM)] − g]V
0
e(ws) − 1,f o rwτ <w M. (26)












6 Appendix B: Moments
To compute the moments in the data, we use following formulas. Note that all moments
are calculated by each month in the labor market τ =1 ,2,···,216. For example, mneD is a


















































































where MW(τ) is the minimum wage.








































































































where MW(τ) is the minimum wage and NS =2 5is the total number of simulations.
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 Figure 4: The proportion of workers who stay on the same job, stay nonemployed, and move 
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Figure 8a: Wage growth from all wage observations
Tenure on the job
 LnWt - LnW0  Fitted values



























Figure 8b: Wage growth on each job
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DATA MODELFigure 15: Predicted percentage of workers paid below the minimum wage before and after 
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MODEL: alpha=0.604
SIMULATION: alpha=0.302